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This study tests

a

S.

Feldman

proposed dual processing model that

suggests that cognitive processing style affects
people's

accuracy in detecting deception.

A videotaped sample of

target individuals, in which each target makes
honest and

dishonest statements, was shown to ninety-one
participants, who judged each target's truthfulness.
Participants' distraction was manipulated in order to

promote effortful and uneffortful processing.

It was

expected that participants exposed to low levels of

distraction would engage in effortful processing, while
those participants exposed to high levels of distraction

would engage in uneffortful processing.

It was also

hypothesized that highly distracted people, who are
presumably engaging in uneffortful processing, would
attend more to nonverbal behaviors, while people in the
low distraction condition, who engage in more effortful

processing, would attend to the central
iii

(verbal)

arguments

of a message.

Because nonverbal behaviors are most

revealing of deception, participants in
the high

distraction condition were expected to show
more accuracy
in distinguishing between honest and
dishonest messages

compared to participants in the low distraction
condition
The results of the study did not support this
hypothesis,

possibly because the distraction manipulation for
high
distraction participants may have been excessively
distracting.

It was found that participants'

recall of

the arguments presented to them in the video was

significantly related to their accuracy at detecting
deception.
found,

Specifically,

a

curvilinear relationship was

where people who had poor recollection of the

arguments, and those with high recall, were not as

accurate at detecting deception, compared to people with

average recall of arguments.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

ABSTRACT

....

LIST OF TABLES

Ill

...

LIST OF FIGURES

VI

...

Vll

Chapter
1.

INTRODUCTION

^

Nonverbal Cues as Indicators of Deception
Cognitive Processing and Attention to
Nonverbal Cues
The Dual Processing Model
Current Study
2.

METHOD

4.

2

3
5
-y

g

Overview
Targets
Stimulus Material
Participants
Procedure
3.

.

g
9

iq
12
12

RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
Design and General Results
Effects of Distraction on the Detection of
Deception
Gender Differences

20

DISCUSSION

25

REFERENCES

15
15
16
17

31

V

LIST OF TABLES

Mean truthfulness rating (and standard
deviations) for the interaction between
distraction and type of message
.

.

Truthfulness ratings (and standard
Deviations) for judge sex x target
sex X type of message interaction

Truthfulness ratings (with standard
deviations) for judge sex x target
sex X distraction condition x
type of message analysis

vi

.

.

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure
1.

Page

Curvilinear relationship between
detection accuracy and the proportion
of arguments recalled ...

vii

01

CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

Research has found that detecting deceit is
not an easy
task.
For example, when attempting to
distinguish between
people being honest and dishonest, judges' accuracy
is

usually only slightly above chance levels (Kraut,
1980)
the other hand,

(Ekman and O'Sullivan,

expressions such as smiling (Ekman, Friesen,

1991).
&

Facial

O'Sullivan,

body movements and voice pitch (Ekman, Friesen,

Scherer,

1976)

On

nonverbal behaviors are fairly good

indicators of deceit

1988),

.

&

have been empirically studied, and each has

been shown to be

a

predictor of actual deception.

Although DePaulo, Zuckerman, and Rosenthal (1980)
argued that the ability to detect lies is strongly

contingent on situational factors, Frank and Ekman (1997)
showed that good lie detectors are able to detect lies
across different high-stakes situations.

In the Frank and

Ekman study, the same judges participated in two

experiments, viewing scenarios and judging deception in
those scenarios.

It was found that judges'

accuracy at

detecting deception in the first experiment predicted their

accuracy in the second experiment.

The results of this

study suggest that there are strategies that people use

1

.

.

across situations that help in detecting
deception

accurately
Nonverbal Cues as Indicators of Deception
Nonverbal behaviors are readily perceived.
example,

For

an increase or decrease in voice pitch,

body

movement, and smiling are all very easily noticed
by

casual observer.

a

Furthermore, nonverbal behaviors are not

only easily detectable, but also happen to be the behaviors
that are most highly correlated with deception.

DePaulo and

colleagues and Ekman and colleagues have investigated

behaviors such as smiling (Ekman et al, 1988) and voice
pitch

(Ekman et al

.

,

1976),

and they have established that

these nonverbal behaviors typically are more predictive of

deception than verbal behavior (DePaulo, Stone,
1985)

.

judges'

Lassiter,

&

Therefore, when attending to certain nonverbal cues,

accuracy is likely to rise.

On the other hand,

paying attention to the arguments,

thinking of counter-arguments, and verifying the logic of an
argument are all fairly complex tasks that require

considerable cognitive effort.

It stands to reason then,

that judges who engage in this effortful processing are less
apt to attend to nonverbal cues that accompany

a

message,

and consequently are less likely to correctly identify

deception

.

Cognitive Processing and Attention to
Nonverbal Cues
Surprisingly, little research has been done
on how

people who are judging for deceptiveness
process the verbal
message.
However, the attitude change literature
can

provide some clues as to the processes involved.

Persuasion

research shows that people who are motivated and
able to
scrutinize a message are likely to engage in effortful

processing and pay attention to the central arguments of
that message,

while people who are not motivated or not able

to scrutinize a message will resort to peripheral processing

(Petty

&

Cacioppo,

198

6)

In peripheral or uneffortful

.

processing, people use cues inherent in the context of the

message to make attributions and judgments about that
message.

Such peripheral cues are likely to encompass

nonverbal cues, which predict deception (Stiff, Miller,
Sleight, Mongeau, Garlick,

Furthermore,

and Rogan,

1989)

the processing style people engage in

predicts the type of cues people attend to when judging for
deceptiveness.

Stiff et al.

familiarity hypothesis.

(1989)

proposed the situational

This hypothesis states that people

in unfamiliar situations engage in uneffortful processing

because they have "little basis for evaluating the validity
of verbal content"

(p.

560).

Therefore, people shift their

attention to more readily accessible nonverbal cues.

People

in familiar situations are said to
be engaged in effortful

processing because they are able to
"visualize" the
situation and therefore assess the plausibility

and validity

of the verbal message.
In support of this reasoning,

Stiff et al

.

(1989)

found

that people judging for decept iveness in familiar
situations
(i.e.,

effortful processing) paid attention to the verbal

aspects of

a

message while ignoring the visual components.

On the other hand,
(i.e.,

when the situation was not familiar

uneffortful processing), people paid attention to

both the visual and, to some degree, the verbal aspects of
the message when judging for deceptiveness

.

On the basis of

these results, it seems possible that in effortful

processing, people rely more on the verbal component of

message to arrive at

a

judgment about deceptiveness, while

in uneffortful processing,

cues.

a

people rely more on the nonverbal

Therefore, when making judgements about

deceptiveness, people engaging in uneffortful processing may
have an advantage over those engaging in effortful

processing because during uneffortful processing they attend
more to the range of behaviors indicative of deception.
short,

In

people engaging in uneffortful processing should be

better at detecting deception than people engaging in

effortful processing.

The Dual Processing Model

Priester and Petty (1995)

found that people who are

suspicious of deception are more likely to engage
in
effortful processing than people who are not
suspicious.
Because the task of detecting deception in the context
of an
experiment inherently involves suspicion of the person
being

judged,

it would seem reasonable that judges will employ
an

effortful processing style and pay particular attention to
the verbal aspect of a message.
is personally relevant,

Furthermore, when the task

central processing tends to become

stronger (Petty and Cacioppo,

1986)

Conseguent ly

.

,

people

will pay even closer attention to central arguments of

a

message, which actually have little or no predictive value.
In short,

the suspiciousness involved in deception detection

and the relevance of the task would make judges engage in

more effortful processing, and as

a

result, people engaging

in effortful processing should show relatively poorer

accuracy in distinguishing between truthful and untruthful

messages

.

On the other hand,

when people are not motivated or

able to attend closely to the verbal aspect of

a

message,

they increase their attention to the nonverbal cues when

making

a

judgement about decept i veness

.

By increasing their

reliance on nonverbal cues, people attend to the range of

.

behaviors that will increase their chances
of making an
accurate judgement of decepti veness
Hence, people engaging
in uneffortful processing should be
better detectors of
deception than people engaging in effortful
.

processing.

In support of this reasoning,

press)

asked judges,

Forrest and Feldman (in

for whom the task was either personally

relevant or not personally relevant, to watch
videotaped
samples consisting of people giving honest or dishonest
messages.

After viewing each sample, they judged the

perceived sincerity of each target person's message.
The results of the study showed that,

as predicted,

people who were highly involved in the task (i.e., more

motivated to scrutinize

a

message) where less accurate at

distinguishing between honest and dishonest statements than
people who were not as involved (low motivation to

scrutinize

a

message)

.

The results of the study are

consistent with the idea that people engaging in uneffortful

processing pay attention to
nonverbal behaviors)
(Stiff et al.,

1989),

a

range of behaviors

(i.e.

that are highly predictive of deception

and therefore show an increase in

accuracy compared to those people that engage in effortful

processing and pay attention to the verbal aspects of the
message

6

Current Study
To provide greater support for the
notion that

uneffortful processing leads to better lie
detection than
effortful processing derived from the dual
processing model
for detecting deception,

the current study investigates an

additional factor that would be expected to affect
processing: distraction.

Petty, Wells,

and Brock

(1976)

investigated the effects of distraction on processing
style,
and had participants engage in two tasks at the same time.
One task was

a

distraction task and the other task involved

attending to

a

recorded persuasive message.

It was

found

that at lower levels of distraction, messages that were

difficult to counter-argue were more persuasive than easy-

to-counter-argue messages.

On the other hand,

if

distracted, people were persuaded by difficult and easy

messages about the same, suggesting that people pay close
attention to the central arguments of

a

message at low

levels of distraction, while people experiencing higher

levels of distraction paid less attention to the arguments

relating to the issue.

Cacioppo (1986)

From this research.

Petty and

concluded that in order to engage in

effortful processing, people must have the motivation and
the ability to do so.

Consequently, if uneffortful

processing leads to better detection of deception, then

distractions that promote this type of
processing should
also lead to increases in lie detection
accuracy.

The proposed study largely replicated the
Forrest and
Feldman (in press) study, except that distraction
was used
instead of involvement to produce effortful and
uneffortful

processing.

A low distraction manipulation is expected
to

permit effortful processing, and

a

high distraction

manipulation is expected to block the ability to attend to
the central arguments,

processing.

and hence, provoke uneffortful

If this happens,

then,

people in the high

distraction condition will be more accurate at

distinguishing between honest and dishonest statements
compared to people in the low distraction condition.

8

CHAPTER

2

METHOD

Overview

Groups of

prepared for
press).

to 12 judges viewed a stimulus
videotap<

6

previous study (Forrest and Feldman, in

a

The videotape consisted of

64

messages in which

half the target persons were female and half
male, and half
the messages were honest statements and half were

dishonest

^
.

The judges rated the truthfulness of each target

person's message.

Furthermore, the judges were instructed

to also pay attention to tones heard throughout the video,

and remember their pitch (high or low) until the end of each

Distraction was manipulated by varying the number of

clip.

tones presented for each video clip.

The high distraction

condition had

3

tones per clip, while the low distraction

condition had

1

tone per clip.
Targets

A total of 24 undergraduates were recruited and

recorded for the creation of the stimulus tapes, but two

participants did not consent to the release of the

^Target motivation was also manipulated by describing the
ability to make impressions on others as very important (high
or not the focus of the session (low motivation)
motivation)
This manipulation was devised for the Forrest and Feldman
(submitted) study, and was not considered in the current study.
.

,

9

recordings, and six targets did not follow
the instructions
correctly.
Attractiveness ratings were collected
for the 16

remaining targets

(half male,

half female), because

researchers have found that people assume that
attractive
targets are more honest than unattractive
targets

(Zebrowitz, Voinescu,

Collins,

&

1996).

None of the

remaining 16 target persons was rated above or below

2

standard deviations from the mean, therefore, all were

employed to create the stimulus tapes.

All target persons

received experimental credit for their participation.
Stimulus Material

Prior to the beginning of the recording session, each

target person had been asked their opinions on four

statements:

(1)

Nuclear power is not very safe;

(2)

The

government should put further restrictions on immigration;
(3)

and

The death penalty should be instituted in all States;
(4)

There is too much violence on T.V.

instructed to communicate

4

messages to

a

The targets were

person behind

one-way mirror, and their responses were videotaped.

a

The

targets were told that the study concerned people's ability
to make good impressions on others and they were asked to

give arguments supporting their opinion on two of the
issues,

and supporting

other two cases.

a

counter-attitudinal stance in the

Therefore, each target person communicated
10

two honest and two dishonest messages.

The order in which

targets communicated the honest and
dishonest messages was
random, as was the order of the issues.
From each of the target person's messages,
the first
argument espoused for each of the issues was
selected

as the

stimulus message.

The 64 resulting messages were edited

into four stimulus tapes approximately 26 minutes
long,

consisting of
seconds with

64
a

clips,

each lasting approximately 15

second delay between each clip.

10

All

target persons appeared on each of the stimulus tapes
four
times,

twice being honest, and twice being dishonest.

of the clips was randomly assigned

a

number from

1

Each

to 64,

representing the position in the tape in which the clip
would be shown.
tapes,
64,

The clips were edited into four stimulus

two of which showed the clips in the order of

1

to

and the others in the opposite order.
The distraction manipulation was edited into the tapes

by adding high or low pitch tones into the audio portion of
the videotapes.
the clips)

tapes

Two tapes

contained

(again,

1

(one with reversed ordering of

tone per clip, while the other two

one of them having reversed order)

tones per clip.

contained

The pitch of the tones varied in random

fashion within each clip, as did the time lapse between one
tone and the next.
11

3

Participants
A total of 89 participants

(42 male,

47

female),

whos.>e

first language was English, acted as the
judges of honest
and dishonest messages in the stimulus
tape.
The

participants received experimental credit in
their

introductory psychology classes for their
participation in
this experiment.
Procedure

Groups of

6

to 12 participants,

who acted as judges,

were given written instructions and response sheets.

The

instructions described the study as an investigation into
the process of performing two tasks at the same time.

There

were two sets of written instructions, one for each of the

distraction conditions.
that judges would watch

The written instructions stated

videotape of people communicating

a

arguments about certain issues.

The four issues presented

in the tape were provided in the instruction sheet.

The

judges were also made aware that in the stimulus tape, the

targets might,

in some cases,

try to give false impressions,

and are therefore sometimes honest and sometimes dishonest.
In the first task,

the judges were asked to rate each

target's truthfulness on
"very truthful" and

(9)

a

9-point scale anchored at

(1)

"very untruthful" after each clip.

12

Judges were then told that

a

second task would be

performed at the same time as the videotape
was being shown
and truthfulness ratings were being
recorded.
Judges were

instructed that the second task would consist
of an auditory
perception test. They were instructed to listen
to the

pitch

(high or low)

condition)

or

3

of either

tones

1

tone

(in the

low distraction

(in the high distraction condition),

remember the pitch of the tone(s), and record the
pitch at
the end of each clip.

After the judges had read the

instructions and the experimenter had answered any questions
regarding the procedure, sample tones were played to the
judges before the stimulus tape was started in order to

familiarize them with the auditory task.
One of the four stimulus tapes was then played.

The

auditory distraction condition was chosen in advance but the

experimenter was not aware of which distraction condition
would be used until the moment the experimenter had to hand
the written instructions to the participants,

experiment was about to start.
started,

and the

After the experiment

the experimenter went to the back of the room,

behind the participants.
After all

64

clips had been shown and judged,

manipulation checks were administered, where open-ended
questions and forced choice questions measured the effect of
13

the cognitive load on arguments recalled
and overall

distraction.

Specifically, participants were asked if
"the
pitch of the tones was easy to remember",
and if

"remembering the pitch of the tones made
listening to the
arguments difficult."
Furthermore, participants

wrote down

the arguments they remembered hearing on the
tapes for each
of the four different topics.

They were given two minutes

for each of the four topics to recall the arguments
given in

the tape.

14

CHAPTER

3

RESULTS

Manipulation Checks
Participants'

ratings on the manipulation checks

revealed that people

m

the low distraction condition
found

the tones easier to remember

(M

the high distraction condition
<

.05.

= 3.14)
(M =

than participants in

2.38),

F(l,87)

=

6.64,

p

Participants in the high distraction condition,

compared to participants in the low distraction
condition,
felt that that remembering the tones made paying
attention
to the arguments more difficult

respectively),

F(l,

87)

=

8.01,

(M

=

p <

4.49; M = 3.41
.01.

The proportion of arguments recalled by the

participants was calculated by adding the number of
arguments the participants recalled and dividing by the
actual number of arguments in the tape.

There were 41

different arguments throughout the tape; different target
persons repeat some of the arguments.

immigration issue,

For example,

in the

four target persons argue that U.S.

citizens might loose their jobs because of lower paid
immigrants.

Also,

participants' answers were screened for

their accuracy, and false recalls were not added to

calculate the proportion.

As predicted,

low distraction condition remembered
15

a

participants in the

greater proportion of

the arguments

condition

(.44),

(.36),

than those in the high
distraction

F(l,85)

= 7.52,

p <

.01.

Design and General Results
A

2

(distraction: high,

of message:

low)

honest, dishonest) x

used to analyze the data.

x

2

(^udge sex)

(target sex)

2

x 2

(type

ANOVA was

Distraction and judge sex were

between subjects factors, and type of message
and target sex
were within subjects factor. ^ The
truthfulness
ratings on

the 9-point scale were used as the dependent
variable.

The

judges were the units of analysis because of our
interest in
the judges' processing style.
Some researcher have found that people, in general,
are

able to significantly differentiate between honest and

dishonest messages

(e.g.,

DePaulo

&

Rosenthal,

1979),

and

this study is congruent with those findings: There was

significant main effect for type of message, F(l,
98.70,

p <

.001.

more truthful
5.033)

(M =

85)

a

=

The observers judged honest statements as
5.58)

than dishonest statements

(M =

.

preliminary analysis was conducted to examine whether the
order in which the clips were presented affected people's
attribution of truthfulness. Although an order x type of message
interaction was significant, F(l,81) = 5.51, p < .05, inspection
of the means involved in the interaction did not reveal a clear
pattern and there is no theoretical explanation for the finding.
16

.

An interaction effect between
distraction and type of
message was expected, where the difference
between

judgements of honest and dishonest messages
for undistracted
Dudges should be smaller than the difference
in judgements
for distracted judges.
However, the data did not
reveal the

expected pattern,

F(l,

85)

= 3.68

p < n.s.

In fact,

inspection of the means revealed that the pattern
of results
was contrary to the one expected (see Table

1)

Because the pattern of results contradicted
predictions, several exploratory analyses were conducted.
It is possible that the high distraction manipulation was

powerful enough to disrupt participants' ability to attend
to certain aspects of the message.

To investigate this

possibility, an internal analysis was conducted across

experimental conditions.

Correlations were computed between

the proportion of arguments recalled by participants and the

participants' accuracy scores.

A participant's accuracy

score is the mean truthfulness rating for all the honest

target clips minus the mean truthfulness rating for all the

dishonest target clips.
accurate

a

The higher the score,

the more

participant was in differentiating between honest

and dishonest messages.

17
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Inspection of the scores revealed two
outliers, both of
whom had accuracy scores four standard
deviations
above the

mean.

Each also had high leverage, since
one had recalled
significantly more arguments than average,
and the other had

recalled

a

average.

significantly lower number of arguments
than
These two outliers were removed from the

analysis.

A linear regression between accuracy
score and

proportion of arguments recalled revealed no significant
linear relationship with zero percent of the variance
explained,

F(l,

82)

=

.02,

p = n.s.

The possibility of

curvilinear relationship was then investigated.

a

It may be

argued that people with low recall and people with high
recall would be the worst detectors of deception, while

people with average recall would be the best detectors of
deception.

Specifically, people with high recall of the

arguments presented might ignore nonverbal behaviors and

peripheral cues in order to concentrate on the central
aspect of the message.

People with low argument recall may

not have been paying attention to much at all,

therefore,

just as they neglected the arguments, they might also have

neglected nonverbal behaviors.

These predictions are in

line with the suggestion that too much distraction may have
led to lower levels of accuracy in detecting deception

19

because levels of distraction that are
too high should
interfere with the attention process.

Consistent with these arguments, it was
found that a
regression with a quadratic model significantly
accounted
for 7.7% of the variance,

F(2,81)

=

3.39,

p <

.05.

People

with higher and lower recall of arguments were
less accurate
in detecting deception than people with average
recall of

arguments

(see Figure

1)

.

Gender Differences
The original analysis of variance identified some

gender differences in the detection of deception.

A target

sex by type of message interaction was found in which judges

could distinguish between the honest and dishonest

statements told by target females

dishonest M

=

4.87),

(honest M = 5.91;

but judges were unable to distinguish

between the statements told by target males (honest M
5.28; dishonest M = 5.26),

F(l,

= 71.35,

85)

=

.001.

p <

pattern was found for both men and women judges in
sex X target sex x type of message interaction.

a

This

judge

Male and

female judges differentiated more easily between the honest
and dishonest statements of female targets, compared to male

target persons,
Finally,

a

(see Table 2).

14.35 p

<

.001

four-way judge sex

x

target sex

F(l,

distraction condition

85)

x

=

x

type of message interaction was
20
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Male

Target

5.33

(.97)

00
IT)

Judge

O

X
X
(D

Male

i
Female

Target

5.69

(1.00)

4.94

(1.01)

a
o
>

T3
Judge

Male

Target

5.24

(.67)

5.369

(.85)

r-!

Female

Female

6.12

(1.00)

4.813

1)

(.95)
03

Target

of
Dishonest

Message

Honest

X5

Type

(L)

22

.

found,

F(l,85)

= 5.32,

p <

.05.

Inspection of the means

found that both male and female judges
in the low
distraction condition were better at
detecting deception
female targets, than in male judges, but
only

m

female judges

in the high distraction condition were
able to detect

deception accurately in female targets.

When rating the

truthfulness of male targets, female judges could
not

differentiate between the honest and dishonest message.
fact,

in general,

In

they rated dishonest messages told by male

targets as more truthful than honest statements.

On the

other hand, male judges could, to some degree, detect

deception in male targets

(see Table
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3)

Male

Target

5.46

(.69) 5.23

(.73) 5.21

(1.19)

in

o

5.17

(1.13)

5.41

(.94)

5.17

(.90)

Judge

Female

Target

Male

5.95

(.86) 5.18

(1.04)

(1.07)

5.42

1
Male

Target

5.33

(.58) 5.26

(.83) 5.12

Target

6.14

(.92) 5.34

(.85) 6.09

(.75)

Judge

Female

Female

of

(1.08)

Dishonest

Honest

Dishonest

Honest

Message

Type

Distraction

Condition

High

Low
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CHAPTER

4

DISCUSSION

This study found, as some previous
studies have
(DePaulo and Rosenthal, 1979), that
people in general can
distinguish between honest and dishonest
statements.
However, while people could significantly
distinguish

between honest and dishonest statements, the
difference of
rated truthfulness for honest and dishonest statements

was

not very large.

The main point of the current study was to investigate

how differences in processing styles might affect people's

accuracy in detecting deception.

It was predicted that

people engaged in low elaboration processing would be more

accurate in detecting deception than people engaged in high

elaboration processing, because while engaged in low
elaboration processing

a

the nonverbal aspects of

person is more likely to attend to
a

message.

Unfortunately, the manipulations in this study did not
have the intended effects on people's accuracy at detecting

deception.

Contrary to our predictions, people in the high

distraction condition were not more accurate at detecting
deception than people in the low distraction condition.
Nevertheless, evidence from the supplemental regression

analysis offers tentative support for the idea that amount
25

of argument recall affects people's
detection of deception.

Furthermore,

some gender differences in the
accuracy of

detecting deception were found.
The distraction condition assigned to
the participants
was not related to people's accuracy
distinguishing

m

between honest and dishonest messages.

Further analyses

showed that the distraction condition predicted the

proportion of arguments that
tapes,

a

person recalled from the

but the proportion of arguments recalled was not

related in

a

linear fashion to people's accuracy at

detecting deception.

Instead, deception detection accuracy

and the proportion of arguments recalled were related in

curvilinear fashion.

a

The pattern of this relationship

showed that people who paid more of attention to the

arguments of

a

message

(high recall)

little attention to arguments

and those who paid

(low recall)

were not as

proficient in detecting deception than those people who gave
a

moderate amount of attention to the arguments of

(average recall)

a

message

.

These results suggest that the amount of attention

person gives to the verbal component of

a

message

(i.e.

a

the

arguments) may, to some extent, determine people's accuracy
at detecting deception.

In this case,

if people recalled

most of the arguments or not enough of the arguments
26

.

presented to them, their accuracy at
detecting deception
wasimparred.
Taken together with previous
studies

and Feldman,

in press;

Stiff et al

tentative evidence for
deception,

a

.

,

1989),

(Forrest

this provides

process model of detecting

in which a person's recall of the
arguments

presented determine how accurate that person
is in detecting
deception
The results of the study suggest that at
some high

level of distraction,

a

person's interest and/or attention

in verbal and nonverbal behaviors is low,

and therefore,

accuracy in detecting deception will also suffer.

Although

people in this high distraction condition may be attending
to peripheral cues,

as intended,

they might be paying

attention to peripheral cues that are extremely easy to

perceive such as, for example, attractiveness.

These

peripheral cues are not necessarily related to the
deceptiveness of the target person and therefore are of
little use when attempting to detect deception.
Further studies should be conducted in order to

understand the possible relationship between

a

person's

processing style when detecting deception and that person's
accuracy in making those judgements.

High levels of

distraction may have impaired people's ability to attend to
the deceptive messages.

Consequently,
27

a

study that

incorporates moderate levels of distraction
should be
carried out to further test the
hypotheses investigated in
this thesis.
Because people in a moderate
distraction
condition would be able to pay attention
to peripheral cues
while also performing the distraction task,
it would be
expected that people in a moderate distraction
condition
will be more accurate in detecting deception

than people in

low and high distraction conditions.

support to

a

This result would give

dual-process model for detecting deception.

It might be argued that the differences found
in

Forrest and Feldman (in press) and in the regressions

performed on the present study are due to differences in the
persuasiveness of the target persons' messages.

That is,

when targets are being honest, they may be more or less

persuasive than when they are dishonest.

However,

initial

evidence contrary to this alternative explanation has been
found in
study,

a

pilot study (Forrest,

1997)

.

In this pilot

judges rated the persuasiveness of target messages,

which were either honest or dishonest.

Furthermore,

different judges rated the truthfulness of each of the
target messages.

It was found that truthfulness ratings

were related to the persuasiveness of

persuasiveness did not vary as

a

message, but

function of the actual

honesty or dishonesty of the message.
28

a

Therefore,

these

.

.

initial data suggest that although people
base some of their
judgements of deceptiveness of a message
on the

persuasiveness of that message, this portion
of the variance
does not explain the differences in deception
detection
accuracy
The present study also found some gender
differences.
One of these effects was

(Forrest

&

Feldman,

a

replication from

in press)

a

previous study

using the same target video.

Lies told by male targets were significantly more difficult
to detect compared to lies told by female targets.

Although

it has been found that males are not as good as females at

communicating nonverbal facial expressions (Hall, 1984), the
evidence for men being better liars is quite mixed.

Although this finding is

a

replication from an earlier

finding, both studies used the same stimulus video,

therefore the finding lacks generalizability because the
effect could be
the video.

a

function of the specific target persons on
as suggested by DePaulo,

Still,

and O'Brien 1988

,

Kirkendol, Tang,

women, when placed in the task of being

deceptive, may be naturally more motivated to make
impression,

a

good

and consequently worse at hiding their

dishonesty
In conclusion,

this study provides tentative evidence

in support of a dual-process model of detecting deception,
29

but research incorporating more levels of
distraction is

clearly needed in order to shed light on the
processes at
work.
In addition, it is important to
understand what

cues

people attend to when judging for deception in
others.

As

suggested earlier, people may base their attributions
of
deception, at least in part, to the persuasiveness of

the

message, but this effect should be more pronounced for

people engaged in high elaboration processing.

People

engaged in peripheral processing attend to other aspects of
a

message,

aspects of

and further research should investigate which
a

specific message people attend to when engaged

in low elaboration processing.
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